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ABSTRACT

This paper contends that the conventional ways in which art is accounted for exclude all but the interests of the dominant social group and effectively defeat many of the initiatives that have been taken in the field over the last three decades to account for the values, aspirations, and beliefs of minority groups. The paper attempts to show how this has been the product of a misclassification of the concept of "art" and of a naive view of multiculturalism as social practice. The paper explores the idea of art as a social institution and discusses the concepts of culture, multiculture, and bi-culture. It concludes with a discussion of the implications for art education arising from the use of these concepts. (Contains 12 references.) (BT)

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



"The Mis-Classification of Art as it Works Against an Inclusive Art Education"

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THE MIS-CLASSIFICATION OF ART AS IT WORKS AGAINST AN INCLUSIVE ART EDUCATION

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Introduction

This paper began life as a keynote address to the Heads of Australian Art and Design Schools Conference held in Auckland some four years ago. I brought it out of retirement because it seemed to fit well with the theme of this Conference but while revising it I made a number of substantial changes such that, while the main theme remains, it is differently cast and the orchestration, as it were, has changed substantially.

In what follows I shall contend that the ways in which we conventionally account for art exclude all but the interests of the dominant social group and that they effectively defeat many of the initiatives which have been taken in our field over the last three decades to account for the values, aspirations and beliefs of minority groups. In pursuing that contention I shall attempt to show how this has been the product of a misclassification of the concept art and a naive view of multiculturalism as social practice.

I'll begin by exploring the idea of art as a social institution, I'll then speak about the concepts of 'culture', 'multi-culture' and 'bi-culture and I'll conclude with a discussion of the implications for art education arising from our use of these concepts.

The Concept 'Art' As Social Institution

Conventional discourse about art proceeds on the largely unquestioned assumption that art has an existence in art works. There is some dispute about what it is that makes something an art work and certainly no less dispute about what makes an art work worthwhile. But there appears to be little dispute that art works are the locus of art: that some feature or features of art works or, indeed, art works themselves are instances of the concept 'art'.

An extrapolation of George Dickie's Institutional Theory of Art (Dickie 1970) offers an alternative to this view.

Following nearly thirty years of argument since it was first published (Dickie 1970), art theorists seem to have accepted at least two features of Dickie's theory with, if not enthusiasm, an unprecedented degree of unanimity. First, they accept Dickie's argument that art works are assigned their classification, not in virtue of any properties which they share with all art works and only art works but because they have undergone a particular kind of institutional classification assigning process and, second, they accept that the existence of this particular process (when seen in relation to other similar such art institutional processes) amounts to evidence in support of Dickie's claim to the existence of something called 'The Institution of Art'.

For the moment, however, that's about as far as art theorists will go in support of Dickie's theory because, on their view, these two claims, while persuasive, fail to get us anywhere in that Dickie fails to tell us enough about the nature of art itself (Dziemidok 1988): in particular, he fails to give us answers to such fundamentally important questions as how we determine value in art, how we come to know art, what function art serves in social life and what kind of existence it has.

I want to insist, however, that this is not the case: that Institutional Theory can usefully illuminate all such matters once we have taken full account of what is involved in the notion of the Institution of Art.

The first thing to say is that if Dickie's first and widely accepted claim is true: if, that is, art works are not classified as such because they have any distinguishing properties, it follows from this that we can't assume that they are the locus of art: that art, whatever it is, has an existence in art works since, clearly, if art works have no exhibited properties which distinguish them from other things in the world they can't possess any exhibited properties which distinguish them as instances of the concept 'art'.

Moreover, if Dickie is also correct in his claim that art works are classified as such in virtue of the uses to which we put them and, if he is also correct in his second and also widely accepted claim, that their classification, as art works, is carried out as part of the function of the Institution of Art, then it follows from this that the concept 'art' works in language in the same way as other institutional concepts such as law, government, religion, family and, significantly, the concept 'education'

In other words, if we take Dickie's theory to its logical conclusion it not only calls into question the ontological status of art as a feature of art works, it also implicitly assigns that status to the agency in virtue of which art works are classified as such, that is, the Institution of Art. Moreover, once the ontological status of art has been established as a social institution, the remaining requirements of a full blown theory of art reveal themselves in that, the function of art becomes the function of the Institution of Art, the axiology of art becomes a function of how the Institution of Art meets the value demands of those whose interests it represents while the epistemology of art becomes a question of how the Institution of Art can be known.

I want now to speak about the effects of this interpretation of Institutional Theory on our thinking about art.

How Institutional Theory of Art Changes Our Thinking

When we speak of instances of the concepts of other institutions and the way institutional concepts, in general, work: when we speak, that is, of the things in the world which stand as instances of the idea of institutions we have in mind, we don't speak of objects, the responses of people to objects or the transactions between objects and people - or, indeed, anything of the kind.

We don't, for example, construe the material or conceptual by-products of institutions, such as religion, law, family, and so on, as their instances. We take instances of institutions to be forms of human social practice, distinguished by the institutional context within which they have effect and characterised by the particular institutional purposes they serve. The physical and conceptual by-products of these practices - such as churches, religious books, holy vestments, court buildings, laws, contracts, constitutions, school examination papers and so on - and our ideas about them - are, like art works, meaningless in themselves; taking on meaning only in relation to the social practices which give rise to them and which assign to them the status and value we determine they shall have.

On Institutional Theory of Art, not only does it make no sense to speak of art works as instances of the concept 'art' but it also makes no sense to speak of them as the locus of artistic and aesthetic value, meaning and significance. Indeed, on the face of it, the idea that art is a social institution would seem to have shown us that art works are no more or less than the mere by-products of just one such instance, namely, the particular art institutional practice in virtue of which art works acquire their status.

Put another way, instances of the concept 'art' are, on Institutional Theory, all those practices we associate with the institution of art: all that individuals who act out roles in that Institution do which could be construed as practices which derive their meaning and purpose from the Institution of Art, while art works themselves are merely the material by-products of those instances and, thus of culture itself.

On this view art education theory has conceived of 'artistic value and significance' (Smith & Smith 1979) in quite the wrong way. Such value and significance does not, on Institutional Theory, lie in art works but in the social practices which control the relations of art. In other words, if we seriously want to understand how value arises in art then we should not look for evidence of such value in art works, rather, we should focus our attention on all the value assigning practices which characterise the Institution.

Similarly, from a functional point of view, it's clear, on Institutional Theory, that we've made a profound mistake in assuming that the function of art can be adduced by examining how art works come about and how we use them. What we should be looking at, of course, if we are serious about gaining an understanding the purpose art serves in social life, are the practices of the institution of art: what they consist in, what social purposes they are claimed to serve and what they actually achieve in social life.

The most important implications of Institutional Theory for art educators, of course, arise from the epistemology of art: the question of how we come to know art. And, on this theory, to know art requires that we know the Institution of Art: that we know of its responsibility for conserving, advancing and enhancing the values, beliefs and aspirations of society as they arise in the artistic part of social life, that we know of the kinds of social practices the institution uses to that end and, most importantly of all, we know in whose interests those practices work.

Before I attempt to show how the mis-classification of art as object has defeated many of the initiatives which have been taken in our field over the last three decades to account for the values, aspirations and beliefs of minority groups, I need to do some contextual and conceptual ground clearing around the concept of 'culture' and its sub-concepts of 'multi-culture', and 'bi-culture'. The examples I shall use to this end are drawn from recent experiences in New Zealand social life.

Culture, Multi-culture and Bi-culture

The notion of 'culture' itself is, of course, deeply problematic. 'The UNESCO Framework for Cultural Statistics', for example, claimed that, at the time of its publication in 1986 there were over 500 discrete definitions of culture in fairly common use throughout the world (UNESCO 1986) while Raymond Williams, the noted British social theorist, observed that 'culture' is one of the two or three most complicated words in the English Language (Williams 1981). He didn't say what the other two concepts were that he had in mind but it would be no surprise if they were the concepts 'art' and 'education'.

In any event, there appears to be little agreement among social and cultural theorists about what they mean when they employ the concept of 'culture' while its closely related concepts of 'bi-culture' and 'multi-culture' appear to be even more deeply problematic.

Despite its complexity, however, when we look beyond the play of ideas about culture to the way in which the term is employed by those involved in education in New Zealand today, we find that it proceeds from the tacit assumption that a culture constitutes the values, beliefs and aspirations which distinguish a particular social group, that these things are given substance and form in the language and the collective body of knowledge, both practical and theoretical, belonging to the group and that it is the responsibility of educators to hand on that knowledge to the next generation.

In other words, we accept that knowledge is embedded in language, that language is the very stuff of culture, we see an education as a process of enculturation and we see our role, as educators, as managers of the enculturation process.

This is about as simple as any discussion of this kind can get but we know from experience that putting these assumptions into practice represents a most complex and daunting task which becomes infinitely more complex and infinitely more daunting when we try to take account of the many different social contexts in which we carry out our responsibilities as educators: contexts in which there are many cultures: many different groups which hold to many different sets of values, beliefs and aspirations and, given that we are a democratic society, we have the responsibility of accommodating the needs of all such cultures in schooling: to provide the means, that is, by which all such cultures can be handed on to their next generations.

To attempt such a thing is to attempt a multi-cultural education and those of us who have attempted to meet that requirement in response to government policy - especially those of us in New Zealand who teach in a post colonial society - will know how difficult it is. And the difficulties don't simply arise from the obvious problem of trying to accommodate a variety of often competing cultural values, beliefs and aspirations in one educational context. At best, most of us are uncertain as to how we should do this, especially since, as members of the dominant group, we feel that it is most often inappropriate for us to speak on behalf of another cultural group. If we try to we risk the accusation of paternalism and if we don't, we may be accused of benign - even deliberate - neglect. Moreover, few of us are well prepared to accept the sacrifice of power and privilege which will be required of us if a genuine multi-cultural education is to be provided.

It is also the case that the problems of providing a multi-cultural education go beyond questions of ethnicity when we consider the many sub-cultures within our own culture. We know, for example, that European culture is dominated by the values, beliefs and aspirations of the sub-culture of middle-class, middle aged males and that this sub-culture stands opposed to the values, beliefs and aspirations of other sub-cultures within our own culture, specifically those of women, the young and what we used once to call 'the working classes'.

Clearly, as well as giving serious consideration to the provision of a genuine multi-cultural education which takes account of the cultures of distinctive ethnic groups, we also need to get our own cultural houses in order.

But, for all these difficulties there are few among the dominant group - our group - who stand openly opposed to the idea of multi-culturalism: in art, education or social life in general, because to do so would appear to be undemocratic. And, on the face of it there would seem to be no alternative to a multi-cultural education if we are to preserve, in our society, the democratic right of all individuals and groups to pursue their own values,

beliefs and aspirations: even if, in the process, the special powers and privileges of the dominant group have to be more equitably shared and even if our own culture is, as a consequence, substantially influenced by the others.

Indeed, many of us find the prospect of at least some measure of cultural intermingling fairly attractive and we may even argue to ourselves that an exposure to other cultural influences will help to enrich and protect our own culture from the residue of that degenerating cultural gene pool which our forebears abandoned for a new life in the antipodes. I would expect this to ring especially true for present day white Australians who, in the words of that great Australian, Barry Humpheries, in their efforts to shake off their colonial ties with England, seem to share the same sort of courage which led to their own forebears' convictions.

Multi-culturalism as social policy in New Zealand, however, has failed. It has failed, that is, for the present generation of indigenous people who, following more than 150 years of colonial oppression, grew up in a culture which was in disarray with little or no prospect, in multi-culturalism, of genuine cultural reconstruction. Indeed, although the New Zealand Government still holds tacitly to a multi-cultural social policy there would be few Maori people who see it, in practice, as anything other than an attempt at institutionalised cultural assimilation.

I am unsure of the origin of the term 'bi-culturalism' but it is employed in our country to describe a form of social policy supported by Maori people and liberal white New Zealanders which, first and foremost, requires that we take account of the fact that, since their culture exists nowhere else in the world, we need to make special provision, in the form of strenuous efforts at cultural conservation, not merely to ensure the survival of Maori culture but also, its enhancement as well. All other cultures represented in New Zealand society, it is said, are represented in other world societies, as a consequence of which they require no special forms of cultural conservation in our country.

Bi-culturalism in New Zealand also has a special legal and historical significance in that it was formally accepted as social policy in terms of the treaty the British Crown made with the indigenous people in 1840 at Waitangi: a treaty which required the Crown to govern New Zealand in equal partnership with the Tangatawhenua, the people of the land: a treaty which most New Zealanders are now prepared to acknowledge, has never been honoured.

As social policy, then, bi-culturalism is a product of that treaty and insists on an equal partnership between two cultural groups within New Zealand society - the indigenous culture on the one hand and all other cultures on the other - a partnership which maintains that it is equal in all parts of social life.

The difficulty which some among the dominant group in New Zealand society claim to have with this notion is their view that it offends against their own deep seated cultural beliefs about democracy. It appears, that is, to give the culture of the indigenous people an advantage by assigning to it a status which is not equal with each of the other cultures in New Zealand society but, rather, equal with all the other cultures put together. Moreover, it also implies - at least until the indigenous culture is able to achieve full cultural reconstruction - special social privileges which, in effect, amount to a form of social and cultural apartheid.

For the indigenous people of New Zealand, then, bi-culturalism has been developed as a strategic concept designed, in the first instance, as a means of exposing the forces of assimilation and of achieving what Paolo Friere called the first pre-requisite for overcoming oppression: that is, by revealing that oppression exists (Friere 1979).

In many respects the Maori people have achieved remarkable success in their use of this strategic concept in many areas of New Zealand social life and in a remarkably short space of time. They have, however, been rather less successful in the domain of art in achieving Friere's second pre-requisite for overcoming oppression: that is, by understanding how the oppression works and it's my belief that this is largely due to their having appropriated from Western culture a classification for art which is fundamentally flawed: one which has seduced many New Zealanders into the belief that Maori people are playing a distinctive part in the artistic life of New Zealand society when in fact, this is almost certainly not the case.

Like many other minority groups within the art world, Maori artists, working on the assumption that art is a feature of art works, have focussed much of their attention on attempts to embody various of the formal and narrative features of their distinctive culture in their contemporary cultural products.

On the face of it this work, in art world terms, appears to be doubly successful, not only because of its appeal to the recent and patronising interest of the established art world in anything which arises from 'the exotic fringe' but also as work of a conventional western kind which has an 'exotic edge'. In other words, the

acceptance of this work into the art world is virtually unconditional and uncritical but in its surrender to both kinds of work the established art world interests create the double illusion of appearing to entertain a culturally pluralistic view of art which is, in material terms, consistent with a bi-cultural ideology but which can, in terms of the social practices which produce it, be construed as little more than a disguised form of multi-cultural assimilation.

This process of assimilation is promoted by an established art world policy of art libertarianism which argues the existence of a 'free market' art world operating on a culturally 'level playing field' in which the material features which are alleged to culturally distinguish art works are accommodated into a 'globalised art' in which material differences are uncritically celebrated. But, while
focussing our attention on the differences between the material of cultural production, this same art world operates like a predatory multi-national, subtly asset stripping the very social practices which once distinguished Maori culture and authenticated its cultural products .

The cultural playing field of art can never be level, it is always tilted in favour of those who hold positions of power and authority: a power and authority which is maintained by encouraging the illusion that it is working in the interests of everyone.

When we recognise this we can see that the mis-classification of art works as instances of art is such a fundamental mistake that we are compelled to ask why it has persisted for so long and why, even those art theorists who acknowledge the existence of an institution of art, have failed to grasp its significance. One answer to that question might be that art theorists have simply taken the easy way out by rendering, that is, '.....the object of their study as naive as possible to make it easier to study'. The consequence of this, however, is, at best, that they have ended up, as Bourdieu argues, 'studying an object which is no object at all' (Bourdieu 1987).

Elsewhere, Bourdieu offers a more radical and fundamental answer to the question when, reflecting on the failure of philosophical art theorists to fully grasp the implications of art as an institution, he suggests that the reason we are disposed to conceive of, and to value, art works as instances of art is simply a product of the way our dispositions are constructed from our participation in life in general and in the life of art in particular (Bourdieu 1991). In other words, we've mis-classified instances of art because it serves our interests in the life of art to do so. And, it serves those interests precisely by denying our social initiates the opportunity of a genuine understanding of the life of art since, without that understanding they will be powerless to change it, thus enabling those of us who hold the bulk of the power, authority and privilege in the art world, to hang onto it.

According to Bourdieu, this sort of mis-classification; leading, as it does, to the maintenance of an idea of art which works against the interests of all but the dominant social group, amounts to an act of symbolic violence committed on the members of all other social groups. Acts of this kind, says Bourdieu, arise through the exercise of symbolic power: a power which is embodied in, and derived from, the particular roles which people have been given to play: in this instance, within the art world. And, as he also says, it is a power which is used to commit acts of symbolic violence when its exercise is disguised (Bourdieu 1991).

In other words, when we disguise our true interests (consciously or otherwise) and the power we have at our disposal to maintain and advance those interests within social life, we are acting with symbolic violence against those to whom we wish to deny a share in the power and authority which is vested in the social roles we play.

Institutional Theory, by drawing our attention to the practices of the Institution of Art, helps us to see that by mis-classifying art and by using that mis-classification as a means of disguising the true nature of art we have been able to maintain the legitimacy of our own power and authority by not only disguising how it is used and the means by which it is maintained but also, and crucially, its very existence.

This, in turn, has enabled us to effectively disguise the true nature of the life of art and, as well, the way we've used our own power in that part of life to exclude the large majority of people from taking an effective part in it. So long as we continue to conceal what we know by focussing discourse about art where it can tell us nothing of its nature, we also contribute to the concealment of our own misuse of power. So long as we are able to conceal from our students that the true value of art lies not in some material or conceptual by-products of human practice but in the very human practices which distinguish that part of life from all others, we'll remain fairly secure in our positions of privilege. We'll continue to maintain the value of our own cultural capital and we'll manage to keep a fairly firm grasp on it as well.

Art Education

If all of that is true then the kinds of art educations we provide are clearly inadequate. Indeed, to remedy the situation we need to do two things. The first of these is to see that, in maintaining art works as the central focus of study in all domains of art scholarship, we have not simply afforded them far more attention than they deserve as means of illuminating art we have effectively concealed from them all that is important about the very nature of art. We must refocus art scholarship on what we have now identified as art's genuine instances, namely, that multiplicity of practices associated with all of the relations of art, including all those forms of social practice which the institution of art employs to advance its social gaols and particularly, those practices which have to do with assigning value.

In this way, it would seem, and only in this way, can we be sure of handing on to our students that knowledge of the artistic part of social life which will equally empower all of them with the means of changing it for the better. Similarly, until we change the discourse of art to account for the social practices which distinguish the Institution of Art we maintain its exclusivity: we maintain it as the preserve of those who believe as we do, who value what we value and who aspire to what we aspire to.

The second thing we must grasp is that we would not be fulfilling our role as art educators if we were to use a normative form of discourse in handing on knowledge of the Institution of Art, as if the way it currently functions is acceptable. Clearly, if we were to do that, we would lend legitimacy to all that it does, knowing all the while that what it does is inequitable. At the very least we have a responsibility, as part of an art education, to critically examine the social practices which distinguish it if we are to encourage the perfectly reasonable prospect that such practices can be changed for the better. Moreover, given the widespread suspicion of our social institutions, in general, to take account of the values, beliefs and aspirations of all but the dominant social group, it is reasonable to suppose that any account we give of the Institution of Art should focus precisely on the way its practices work to disadvantage some social groups while providing advantage to others.

This would appear to be a straightforward enough requirement and it seems to meet Friere's second pre-condition for overcoming oppression since it is precisely in the way the practices of a social institution operate in the exercise of symbolic power where we will find evidence of how oppression works in the art world.

The Institutions of Art and Education

In addressing this issue we must also take account of the fact that we are dealing with not one but two social institutions, art and education, both of which operate in a society which provides the context for, not only the social groups which normally constitute one society but also many social groups within many different cultures as well. And if that were not difficult enough, we must also take account of the fact that the Institution of Education is the context within which the social practices which are instrumental in the handing on of culture are determined and exercised.

All that is true of art as a social institution could be true of the Institution of Education in no less significant a measure precisely because that institution is responsible for handing on the culture of all social and ethnic groups in society. And it is in the context of this realisation that we need to take account of the notions of multi-culturalism and bi-culturalism in art education.

As Peters says, whatever else an education does it results in a change of behaviour and that we normally reserve the use of the term 'education' for changes of behaviour which have been for the better (Peters 1966). But, clearly, social and ethnic groups in society will have different views of what constitutes a desirable behaviour change. Indeed, most of the debates about education arise from disputes about just this issue (Hardie 1963).

But it might well be the case that disputes about the kinds of behaviour changes produced by particular kinds of educations are basically the same sorts of disputes as arise about the status and worth of particular art works. That is, disputes which have been made to appear to be founded on genuine matters of value when, in fact, they amount to no more than disguised institutionally contrived forms of the exercise of symbolic power which are designed to keep the power to determine what will be valued in the life of education in the hands of those who hold positions of authority in the Institution of Education itself.

People with power in the institution of education, for example, instituted the policy of multi-culturalism in New Zealand schooling, apparently, in the belief that one education system could accommodate the interests of all social and cultural groups in this society. And, on the basis of that policy, particular kinds of social practices were introduced into the institution which were said to be able to turn policy into practice. We have learned a lesson in retrospect, however, which shows that we can introduce as many new social practices into

education as we like and spend as much money on those practices as the public purse can bear, but if we don't change the existing practices - especially the linguistic ones - the effect of the new ones will be no more than illusory.

The lesson of Institutional Theory is to remind us that education itself is the most powerful institution of all in that, as the instrument of enculturation, it has the power to defeat any changes we might try to make in other parts of life.

We can see this in the fact that education systems are inequitable in that they invariably reproduce the class/culture divisions which already exist in society by failing to acknowledge that children entering the system have, in unequal measure, the linguistic and other cultural competencies necessary to gain access to the dominant class cultural capital. The origin of this inequity is identified by Bourdieu as existing in our habitus; that set of dispositions we acquire long before schooling begins, which have their source in the material conditions of existence belonging to our class/culture (Bourdieu 1977).

But, while the habitus may be the origin of the problem, it is not its cause in that, problems of this kind can only arise if the values beliefs and aspirations produced by our habitus are inconsistent with those advanced by the education system.

Given that all forms of knowledge and intellectual practice are laden with the values of the class cultural group within which such knowledge and practice is generated, any education which is advanced in one class/culture will necessarily disadvantage people whose habitus is located in another.

It would be pointless, on this view, for us to change the forms of discourse which arise in the life of art itself if we don't change them in the processes of education as well. In art education discourse, for example, we still argue that what is worthwhile in what we pass on is the kind of knowledge which encourages such values as individuality, individual enterprise, personal pride, divergent (call it creative) thinking, independence, assertiveness, freedom of expression, freedom from constraint and freedom, apparently, to exploit others: all of them values which have been normatively designated, by the Institution of Art and through its various forms of discourse, as universally positive. Yet females in our own culture and people from other cultures and classes protest that these values are not universal; that they are inconsistent with what they identify as their own values of co-operativeness, interdependence, group-culture identity, tradition and restraint, and, that by assigning positive and universal value to the former values, a universally negative value is, de facto, assigned to the latter.

When the dominant group in art education assigns value in this way we commit an act of symbolic violence on other groups by denying any legitimacy for their own artistic cultural capital while advancing our own group values in the disguise of universality.

All this is done through the assignation of value to particular kinds of art works. It's now fairly clear, for example, that both the institutions of art and education have in place a variety of practices which assign positive value to some kinds of art works and negative value to others and, in so doing, they create a hierarchy of kinds of art works which preserves a place for those produced by white males at its top and those produced by females and other ethnic groups at its bottom.

We know that such practices exist, we know the kinds of positive and negative values which create the resulting hierarchy and we know that the practices exist simply to preserve the positions of privilege within the art world of those who already hold them. Yet it is commonplace to see artists and scholars who claim to work in the interests of their minority groups, submitting themselves to the very hierarchy which oppresses them. Feminist scholars, for example, will spend their lives arguing on behalf of women artists who have been written out of art history and trying to establish for them a place in an art historical hierarchy of white male values (Bracey 1992). Similarly, and paradoxically, Maori artists compete for, and are assigned places of high status within the same hierarchy by making works which are alleged to be attacks upon it.

The truth of the matter is that the established hierarchy of artistic values and the social practices which support it cannot be effectively countered until we understand how all such hierarchies and practices came into being and, in particular, the kinds of linguistic practices on which they are founded. Such an understanding can, I believe, be got from an examination of the largely unquestioned assumption that works of art are instances of the concept art and the repositories of artistic and aesthetic value.

If we can grasp this idea and if we can finally change the focus of the discourses of art and art education from art works to the social practices which distinguish the life of art, we might then be in a position to hand onto

our students such knowledge of the artistic part of social and cultural life as will empower them with the means of changing it for the better.

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